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Abstract
Although the Internet reduces market frictions by making it easier for consumers to
obtain information about prices and product offerings, goods sold by electronic firms are
not perfect substitutes for otherwise identical goods sold by conventional stores. Online
purchases, due to non-zero shipping time, are associated with waiting costs, and they do
not allow consumers to inspect the product prior to purchase. Visiting a conventional
store, on the other hand, involves positive travelling costs. A model extending the circular
city paradigm with two types of firms, conventional and electronic, is studied. Under the
benchmark setting with only conventional firms in the market, each consumer visits the
nearest store and purchases the product there. When electronic firms enter the market,
an intriguing type of market segmentation may arise. First, each consumer travels to the
nearest conventional store to “try on” the product. Second, conventional retailers increase
their prices and sell the good only to consumers who discover that they have high valuations;
consumers with low valuations return “home” and order the good online. In spite of the
increased competition from Internet retailers, welfare decreases.
JEL classifications: D43 (Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfections), D81
(Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty), and L11 (Production, Pricing
and Market Structure).
Keywords: electronic commerce, oligopoly pricing, market segmentation, spatial compe-
tition.
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1 Introduction
Most economic analyses of the Internet have focused on its role as an information retrieval sys-
tem that reduces consumer costs of obtaining information about prices and product offerings.
Bakos’ (1997) seminal article on electronic marketplaces, for instance, shows that reducing
search costs improves market efficiency as a result of the increased competition among elec-
tronic retailers.1
Although the Internet reduces market frictions by making it easier for consumers to compare
prices and product availability, goods sold over the Internet are clearly not perfect substitutes
for otherwise identical goods sold by brick-and-mortar retailers. Hence, the focus of this
paper is on the characteristics of goods that are associated with their modes of marketing
and distribution. First, due to non-zero shipping time, there are waiting costs associated
with online purchases. When these costs are substantial, electronic retailers “lose points” to
conventional stores, where the buyer immediately has access to the product.
Second, goods purchased online cannot be inspected beforehand. This becomes a problem
when there is uncertainty about how well the product “fits”, which can only be resolved by
physical inspection. Searchable sensory attributes, defined by Deregatu, Rangaswamy, and Wu
(2000) as “attributes that can be directly determined through our senses, particularly, touch,
smell, or sound, before we purchase a product”, are important to many products. In the context
of apparel, the fit of the garment and the texture of the material can be evaluated accurately
before purchase only in a conventional store. One would need to visit a furniture store to
learn if the Tempur-Pedic sleep system (pressure-relieving Swedish mattress) matches his/her
individual needs. As another example, consider the purchase of the ThinkPad convertible
tablet, a notebook that provides flexibility to take handwritten notes directly on the screen
with a special digitizer pen. Consumers can best evaluate the tablet by trying it out in a retail
store that sells electronic products. For some consumers, the digitizer pen will “feel right”, for
others – not quite.
With few exceptions (e.g., Brown and Goolsbee 2002, Sengupta and Wiggins 2006) the
economics literature on Internet price competition takes prices charged by conventional retailers
as given. This paper highlights the equilibrium interaction between electronic firms and their
oﬄine counterparts. How do consumers make their purchasing decisions: Do they buy a good
from an ordinary “brick-and-mortar” firm or order the product online? What is the impact
of the Internet on prices charged by ordinary firms? How is economic welfare affected by the
Internet?
To address these questions, a model extending the circular-city paradigm introduced by
Salop (1979) with two types of firms, ordinary stores and electronic retailers, is studied. The
firms sell physically identical products and possess constant marginal cost technology; the
fixed cost of entry is positive for brick-and-mortar stores and zero for electronic retailers.
1Empirical works by Clay, Krishnan, and Wolff (2001) on books and by Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) on
books and CDs suggest that prices online are lower than oﬄine, but online price dispersion is quite high.
3
Consumers want to buy one unit of the product. A consumer can only learn his valuation for
the good prior to purchase by travelling to a brick-and-mortar firm and physically inspecting
the product. Consumers cannot return poorly fitting products to electronic retailers, at least
not at reasonable cost. Also, it is assumed that each consumer has access to the Internet and
can visit an electronic firm without incurring any travelling costs, although there are waiting
costs associated with ordering the product online. The waiting costs take the form of a discount
factor and are, therefore, proportional to a consumer’s valuation.
Standard Bertrand-style arguments establish that the Internet segment of the market is
competitive; at least two electronic firms set the price equal to marginal cost. In a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, conventional stores are located equidistantly around the circle and charge
the same price, and the equilibrium number of conventional stores is determined from the
zero-profit condition.
Two settings are investigated: the benchmark, in which only brick-and-mortar firms oper-
ate, and the Internet setting, in which both types of firms, conventional and electronic, exist in
the market. With certain parameter restrictions in place, under the benchmark each consumer
visits the nearest brick-and-mortar firm and purchases the product there. When electronic
firms enter the market, an intriguing type of market segmentation arises. Each consumer
travels to the nearest conventional store to “try on” the product. Brick-and-mortar retailers
actually raise their prices and sell the good only to consumers who discover that they have
high valuations. Consumers with low valuations return “home” and order the good online.
The equilibrium number of brick-and-mortar firms is either the same or higher compared to
the benchmark.
The result that brick-and-mortar firms raise prices when electronic firms enter the market
contrasts with the common view that increased competition leads to lower prices.2 This result
can be explained by the effect electronic firms have on the elasticity of demand faced by
conventional retailers. Because the demand becomes less elastic, brick-and-mortar firms raise
their prices in equilibrium. Moreover, economic welfare goes down when electronic firms enter
the market, because consumers with low valuations incur positive waiting costs when ordering
the good online. Increase in the number of brick-and-mortar firms is yet another source of
welfare decline.
In the first extension, the Internet setting with oﬄine consumers, it is assumed that a
proportion of consumers do not purchase online, either because they need the product right
away or they simply avoid using the Internet for privacy reasons. In the second extension, the
Internet setting with patient consumers, it is assumed that a proportion of consumers plan
their purchases in advance, so waiting for the good to be delivered is costless to them. Various
welfare effects are investigated.
This paper combines two streams of literature. The first one is marketing literature linked
to consumer behavior in an online environment. Alba et al. (1997), Danaher, Wilson, and
2For other theoretical examples in which increased competition among sellers leads to higher equilibrium
prices, see Satterthwaite (1979) and Rosenthal (1980).
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Davis (2003), Degeratu, Rangaswamy, and Wu (2000), Peterson, Balasubramanian, and Bron-
nenberg (1997), and Ratchford, Talukdar, and Lee (2001) have conducted empirical research
exploring the differences between online and oﬄine purchase experiences, assessing the impact
of prices, brand names, and product attributes on consumer choices.3 These studies suggest
that Internet-related marketing is well suited for functional products for which online stores can
give detailed attribute information. Brand names become more important when the product
category contains sensory attributes that can only be evaluated through physical inspection.
The second stream is economic literature that examines the effect of the Internet on firms’
product market behavior. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) use micro data on individual insurance
policies to analyze the impact of the Internet comparison shopping sites on oﬄine prices. The
authors show that the introduction of the insurance-oriented web sites is initially associated
with high price dispersion. As the use of these sites becomes more widespread, prices and
dispersion fall. Sengupta and Wiggins (2006) provide empirical evidence on how the Internet
sales affect prices paid for airline tickets. The results indicate that an increase in Internet
purchases decreases online prices and, to the greater extent, oﬄine prices. Scot Morton,
Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) investigate the effect of Internet referral services on pricing
behavior of car dealerships. They find that consumers who arrive to a dealership via the
Internet pay less than traditional consumers.
Theoretical work that is somewhat similar to the model presented here is by Lal and
Sarvary (1999). The authors distinguish between two types of product attributes, digital and
nondigital. Whereas digital attributes can easily be conveyed via the Internet, nondigital
attributes can only be judged in person at a retail store. The authors assume two firms that
produce nondigital products and distribute them through their own stores and the Internet.
Each consumer chooses between two products, but is familiar with only one of them. In the case
of destination shopping, the introduction of the Internet increases the effective cost of search
from “the cost of visiting more than one store” to “the cost of undertaking the entire shopping
trip”. As a result, consumers may not search, but instead order the familiar product product
online. The authors show that under some parameter conditions the increased consumer loyalty
induces firms to raise their prices.
Dinlersoz and Pereira (2007) present another theoretical study that focuses on differences
in consumer preferences for traditional and electronic markets. The authors consider a retail
market that is initially served by a single firm. A new firm, which has no physical presence,
competes with the existing firm to open an online store. Each consumer derives utility of 1 from
the product purchased in the physical store of the existing firm, 1−ν from the product ordered
online. Parameter ν is negative when online transactions are associated with convenient search
3In their seminal article on interactive home shopping, Alba et al. (1997) examine consumers’ incentives
to adopt the new distribution channel. Interactive home shopping “enables consumers to access merchandise
unavailable in their local markets, gather vertical information about merchandise at a low cost, efficiently screen
the offerings of a broad cross-section of suppliers”. The trade-offs are that department stores “afford buyers the
opportunity to touch and feel merchandise” and “allow immediate delivery”.
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and savings in travelling costs (books and CDs). For other products, such as clothing items
and furniture, delayed consumption and the inability to inspect the product physically decrease
utility (i.e., ν is positive). Which firm is likely to be the leader in adoption of e-commerce
technology – the existing firm or the new firm? The answer depends on consumer loyalty,
differences in the firms’ technologies and consumer preferences.
In the next section, the formal model is presented. The benchmark is analyzed in Section
3. In Section 4, the Internet setting is studied, and the effect of electronic firms on oﬄine prices
and economic welfare is investigated. Two extensions are explored in Section 5, concluding
remarks appear in Section 6. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, the technology, the preferences of the agents, and the equilibrium concept are
presented.
Two types of firms operate in the market: ordinary brick-and-mortar firms (b-firms), and
electronic retailers (e-firms) that sell via the Internet. The two types produce the same physical
good using different technologies. Electronic firms possess constant marginal cost technology,
Ce(q) = cq.
Brick-and-mortar firms possess constant marginal and fixed cost technology,
Cb(q) =
{
φ+ cq, if q > 0
0, if q = 0.
Fixed cost φ mainly refers to the building costs incurred if a b-firm enters the market.
Consumers with total mass L are distributed uniformly on a circle with a perimeter nor-
malized to 1. Each consumer wants to buy one unit of the product. Consumer i derives utility
of vi if he buys the good from a b-firm and δvi if he purchases from an e-firm, where δ ∈ (0, 1)
is the discount factor. That is, the consumer incurs waiting costs of (1 − δ)vi if he purchases
the good online.4 Consumer i’s valuation vi is random and can take one of two values: it is
high, vH , with probability λ, and low, vL, with probability 1− λ. Consumer i does not know
his valuation at the outset. He can, however, learn vi prior to purchase by travelling to one of
the brick-and-mortar firms located around the circle, which entails transportation cost t per
unit of length.
Each consumer has an Internet connection and can visit an electronic firm without incurring
any additional costs. For simplicity, it is assumed that the cost to a consumer of returning
a poorly fitting product to an e-firm for a refund is prohibitive. Hence, visiting a brick-and-
mortar firm involves positive travelling costs but allows consumers to inspect the product prior
to purchase. Ordering the good from an electronic firm entails no travelling costs, but incurs
4Even though shipping time may involve only a few days, δ may be significantly less than one if by waiting
the consumer will miss an important opportunity to use the good.
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positive waiting costs and does not allow consumers to resolve uncertainty before buying the
product.
Electronic retailers are perfectly competitive. Standard Bertrand-style arguments establish
that in equilibrium at least two e-firms set their prices equal to marginal cost. Brick-and-
mortar firms compete with each other, taking into account that consumers can always order the
product on the Internet. The equilibrium concept employed is a symmetric Nash equilibrium,
in which b-firms are located equidistantly around the circle and charge the same price. Under
the free entry assumption, the equilibrium number of b-firms in the market is determined from
the zero-profit condition.
3 Benchmark: No Internet
In this section, the setting in which only brick-and-mortar firms operate in the market is
analyzed.
Suppose consumer i visited a b-firm and learned his valuation vi. The consumer purchases
the good if the price charged by the firm, pb, does not exceed vi. Thus, his expected payoff of
visiting the firm is given by
λmax{vH − pb, 0}+ (1− λ)max{vL − pb, 0} − txi,
where txi is consumer i’s travelling costs.
How many b-firms will be in the market in equilibrium? Which price will they charge?
Recall that in Salop’s circular city model three equilibrium configurations are possible. In the
monopoly equilibrium, which occurs for non-generic parameter values, the markets of any two
neighboring firms do not overlap and each firm acts as a local monopolist. The markets just
touch in the kinked equilibrium; they fully overlap at the competitive one.
Here consumer valuations are drawn from a binomial distribution, which complicates the
analysis significantly. In particular, the competitive equilibrium configuration splits into three
based on whether the equilibrium price is below, equal, or above vL (Proposition 1). The same
applies to the monopoly and kinked equilibria. Hence, there are nine possible equilibrium
configurations. The conditions under which each of them occurs become much more complex,
because the number of possible cases and deviations increases.
To simplify the analysis, the following will be assumed throughout the remainder of this
section:
vH > c+
3
2λ
√
tφ
L
. (A1)
This condition guarantees that there will be enough firms operating in the market that even
the consumer located right in the middle between two neighboring firms (having to travel the
farthest) receives strictly positive expected payoff. That is, the markets of any two neighboring
firms fully overlap.5
5Refer to Appendix B for the equilibrium analysis when (A1) does not hold.
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It is notationally convenient to define the following constants – thresholds for parameter
vL:
vL ≡ c+
1−√1− λ
λ
√
tφ
L
,
vL ≡ c+
√
tφ
L
.
Observe that c < vL < vL for any λ ∈ (0, 1), and vL < vH by (A1).
Proposition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium Configurations under the Benchmark).
(i) If vL ∈ [0, vL), then the equilibrium price and number of b-firms are given by p∗b = c+ 1λ
√
tφ
L ,
n∗b =
√
tL
φ .
Each consumer visits the closest b-firm and learns his valuation; only consumers with
high valuations purchase the good.
(ii) If vL ∈ [vL, vL], then the equilibrium price and number of b-firms are given by{
p∗b = vL,
n∗b =
L
φ (vL − c).
Each consumer visits the closest b-firm and purchases the good.
(iii) If vL ∈ (vL, vH ], then the equilibrium price and number of b-firms are given by p∗b = c+
√
tφ
L ,
n∗b =
√
tL
φ .
Each consumer visits the closest b-firm and purchases the good.
First, consider low values of vL. The equilibrium price is such that only consumers with
high valuations buy the product. Indeed,
vL < vL < c+
1
λ
√
tφ
L
and
c+
1
λ
√
tφ
L
< vH
by (A1). It is interesting to compare configuration (i) with Salop’s competitive equilibrium,
where  p¯ = c+
√
tφ
L ,
n¯ =
√
tL
φ .
8
It follows that the number of firms is the same, but the price margin is higher by factor 1/λ –
the inverse of the probability a consumer purchases the product.
If vL ∈ [vL, vL], the demand discontinuity results in firms setting their prices equal to vL
and selling the product to all consumers.
If the lowest realization of consumer valuation is high, equilibrium price is below vL,
c+
√
tφ
L
= vL < vL.
Note that configuration (iii) coincides with Salop’s competitive equilibrium.
4 The Internet
In this section, the setting in which both types of firms, brick-and-mortar stores and electronic
retailers, operate in the market is considered. For ease of exposition, this setting is called the
Internet setting.
First, suppose consumer i orders the good from an online retailer. Because electronic firms
are perfectly competitive and set their prices equal to marginal cost, his expected payoff is
simply
δ(λvH + (1− λ)vL)− c.
Second, suppose consumer i visited a b-firm and learned his valuation vi. At this point,
the consumer has three options: buy the good at the store, return home and purchase from an
online retailer, or not buy the good. Thus, his expected payoff of visiting the b-firm is given
by
λmax{vH − pb, δvH − c, 0}+ (1− λ)max{vL − pb, δvL − c, 0} − txi.
How does the introduction of the Internet affect brick-and-mortar firms? Who will purchase
from b-firms, who – from electronic retailers? The answers to these questions depend on the
parameters of the model. If δ is low, say less than c/vH , then consumers will never order
the product online. In this case, the equilibrium price and number of b-firms will remain
unchanged.
Consider the other extreme. If δ is close to 1, then there will be no b-firms operating in
the market. Indeed, a b-firm would have to set its price below c+ (1− δ)vH to make positive
sales, failing to cover the entry fee. Consumers will order the product online if
δ(λvH + (1− λ)vL)− c > 0.
Otherwise, they will not buy the product at all. (A consumer wish he could learn his valuation
at a b-firm and then, if he likes the product, order it online, but there are no b-firms in the
market!)
Proposition 2 shows that if δ is not too high and not too low, the following type of market
segmentation might arise in equilibrium. Each consumer visits a b-firm and learns his valuation;
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consumers with low valuations return home and purchase the good online, whereas consumers
with high valuations buy the product from b-firms.
It is notationally convenient to define the following constants – the upper and lower bounds
for parameter δ:
δ ≡ c
c+ 1−
√
1−λ
λ
√
tφ
L
,
δ ≡
vH − 32λ
√
tφ
L
vH
.
Observe that δ < δ requires
vH >
3
2(1−√1− λ)c+
3
2λ
√
tφ
L
, (A2)
which is stronger than (A1). This inequality will be assumed to hold throughout the remainder
of the paper. Also, let
v˜L ≡ 1−
√
1− λ
(1− δ)λ
√
tφ
L
.
Proposition 2 (Market Segmentation under the Internet Setting). If δ ∈ (δ, δ) and vL ∈
(c/δ, v˜L), then the equilibrium price and number of b-firms are given by p∗∗b = c+ 1λ
√
tφ
L ,
n∗∗b =
√
tL
φ .
Each consumer visits the closest b-firm and learns his valuation; consumers with high valuations
purchase the good from b-firms, whereas consumers with low valuations return home and order
the product online.
It is easy to verify that (A2) together with the conditions of Proposition 2 imply δvL > c
and
(1− δ)vL < p∗∗b − c =
1
λ
√
tφ
L
< (1− δ)vH .
Hence, consumers with low valuations order the product online. Consumers with high valua-
tions prefer to pay higher price to have immediate access to the product.
The next proposition follows directly from propositions 1 and 2. It shows that, in certain
cases, welfare actually falls when electronic firms enter the market!
Proposition 3 (Welfare). Let δ ∈ (δ, δ) and vL ∈ (c/δ, v˜L). The following welfare comparison
holds between the benchmark and the Internet setting.
(i) Consider vL ∈ (c/δ, vL). In this case only consumers with high valuations purchase the
product under the benchmark. When e-firms enter the market, the equilibrium price and
number of b-firms remain unchanged, consumers with low valuations order the product
online. Welfare goes up.
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(ii) Consider vL ∈ [vL, v˜L). In this case all consumers purchase the product under the bench-
mark. When e-firms enter the market, the equilibrium price goes up, consumers with low
valuations switch to electronic retailers. The number of b-firms either remains unchanged
or increases. Welfare goes down.
First, note that (A2) and δ ∈ (δ, δ) imply c/δ < vL < min{v˜L, vL}. Thresholds vL and v˜L,
however, cannot be ranked.
LetW ∗ andW ∗∗ denote welfare under the benchmark and the Internet setting, respectively.
Consider vL ∈ (c/δ, vL). Because consumers with low valuations purchase the product online
under the Internet setting, welfare goes up by
W ∗∗ −W ∗ = L(1− λ)(δvL − c) > 0.
Next, consider vL ∈ [vL,min{v˜L, vL}). Under the benchmark, brick-and-mortar firms set
their prices equal to vL and sell the good to all consumers. When e-firms enter the market,
b-firms would have to lower their prices to c+(1−δ)vL to keep consumers (with low valuations,
in particular) from switching. Instead, b-firms increase their prices. Under the Internet setting,
consumers with high valuations still purchase the good from b-firms, whereas consumers with
low valuations switch to electronic retailers. The equilibrium number of b-firms increases. The
change in welfare equals
W ∗∗ −W ∗ = −L(1− λ)(1− δ)vL −
[
tL
4n∗∗b
+ φn∗∗b −
tL
4n∗b
− φn∗b
]
< 0.
The first term is the waiting costs incurred by consumers with low valuations. Another source of
welfare decline is increase in excessive entry, the characteristic of Salop’s model. Algebraically,
the term in brackets is the change in the travelling (consumers travel (4n)−1 on average) and
entry costs. It is positive because n∗∗b > n
∗
b , and n
∗
b , in turn, exceeds the socially optimal
number of firms
nso =
1
2
√
tL
φ
.
If vL < v˜L, consider vL ∈ [vL, v˜L). Under the benchmark, brick-and-mortar firms set their
prices below vL. When e-firms enter the market, b-firms increase their price margins by factor
1/λ and sell the product only to consumers with high valuations. Because the number of
b-firms remains the same, the change in welfare equals
W ∗∗ −W ∗ = −L(1− λ)(1− δ)vL < 0.
5 Extensions
In this section two extensions are considered. In the first extension, the assumption that all
consumers have access to the Internet is relaxed. In the second extension, it is assumed that
a fraction of consumers find it much less costly to wait for a delivery than the others.
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5.1 Oﬄine Consumers
Assume that a proportion  of consumers do not consider purchasing online as an option, for
various reasons. Some consumers might need the product right away (imagine a person who
procrastinated on the purchase of a birthday present for his/her spouse until the day before),
others avoid using the Internet for privacy reasons, or they simply do not have access to the
Internet.
Thus, there are  oﬄine consumers and 1−  original ones. The analysis of the model be-
comes much more complicated. However, as long as  is sufficiently small, the new equilibrium
price and number of b-firms will differ only marginally from p∗∗b and n
∗∗
b obtained under the
Internet setting, and the purchasing behavior of original consumers remains the same.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium with Oﬄine Consumers). Let δ ∈ (δ, δ), vL ∈ (c/δ, v˜L) and  is
sufficiently small, then either
(i) All consumers visit b-firms. Original consumers with high valuations purchase the good
from b-firms, those with low valuations return home and order the product online. Only
oﬄine consumers with high valuations purchase the good from b-firms. p∗∗b () = c+ 1λ
√
tφ
L ,
n∗∗b () =
√
tL
φ .
or
(ii) All consumers visit b-firms. Original consumers with high valuations purchase the good
from b-firms, those with low valuations return home and order the product online. Oﬄine
consumers purchase the good from b-firms irrespective of their valuations.
p∗∗b () = c+
1√
λ2(1−)+
√
tφ
L ,
n∗∗b () =
λ(1−)+√
λ2(1−)+
√
tL
φ .
The conditions under which each of the above equilibrium configurations obtains are outlined
in the Appendix.
Let W ∗∗() denote welfare under the current extension. Is it higher or lower compared with
the Internet setting? Consider case (i). The introduction of oﬄine consumers does not affect
brick-and-mortar firms when vL < p∗∗b and  is sufficiently small (so that the deviation to vL
is unprofitable). Hence, p∗∗b () = p
∗∗
b and n
∗∗
b () = n
∗∗
b . Welfare goes down, because oﬄine
consumers with low valuations do not purchase the product,
W ∗∗()−W ∗∗ = −L(1− λ)(δvL − c) < 0.
Consider case (ii). Oﬄine consumers do affect brick-and-mortar firms when vL > p∗∗b .
Straightforward algebra reveals p∗∗b () < p
∗∗
b and n
∗∗
b () < n
∗∗
b . The change in welfare equals
W ∗∗()−W ∗∗ = L(1− λ)(1− δ)vL −
[
tL
4n∗∗b ()
+ φn∗∗b ()−
tL
4n∗∗b
− φn∗∗b
]
> 0.
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The first term is the waiting costs saved by oﬄine consumers with low valuations. Another
source of welfare increase is reduction of excessive entry. (The term in brackets is negative
because n∗∗b > n
∗∗
b (), and n
∗∗
b (), in turn, exceeds the socially optimal number of firms.)
As to original consumers, they pay a lower price at b-firms, but travel more. It is shown
in the Appendix that
λ(p∗∗b − p∗∗b ()) >
t
4n∗∗b ()
− t
4n∗∗b
.
Therefore, original consumers fare better in the presence of oﬄine consumers.
The main message of the the previous section is that when vL ∈ [vL, v˜L), welfare goes
down with the introduction of the Internet. This result is reinforced in the current extension
for vL ∈ [vL,min{p∗∗b , v˜L}).6
5.2 Patient Consumers
Now assume that a small proportion ξ of consumers possess discount factor of 1. (These
consumers plan their purchases well in advance, so waiting for the good to be delivered is
costless for them.) Thus, there are ξ patient consumers and 1− ξ original ones.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium with Patient Consumers). Let δ ∈ (δ, δ), vL ∈ (c/δ, v˜L) and ξ is
sufficiently small, then  p∗∗b (ξ) = c+ 1λ√1−ξ
√
tφ
L ,
n∗∗b (ξ) =
√
1− ξ
√
tL
φ .
Patient consumers order the product online from the outset. Each original consumer visits the
closest b-firm and purchases the product there if his valuation is high, otherwise he returns
home and orders the good online.
Compared with the Internet setting, the equilibrium price is higher and the number of
b-firms is lower, p∗∗b (ξ) < p
∗∗
b and n
∗∗
b (ξ) < n
∗∗
b . Let W
∗∗(ξ) denote welfare under the current
extension. Is it higher or lower than W ∗∗?
W ∗∗(ξ)−W ∗∗ = Lλξ(1− δ)vH −
[
(1− ξ) tL
4n∗∗b (ξ)
+ φn∗∗b (ξ)−
tL
4n∗∗b
− φn∗∗b
]
> 0.
Welfare goes up due to reduction of excessive entry and the travelling costs saved by patient
consumers (the term in brackets), even if one ignores the fact that patient consumers incur
zero waiting costs (the first term).
Despite the increase in welfare, original consumers lose from the existence of patient con-
sumers, because they pay higher price at b-firms and, on average, travel more.
Finally, it follows from W ∗∗(ξ)−W ∗∗ > 0 that the existence of oﬄine consumers weakens
the most interesting result of Proposition 3 that the introduction of the Internet might lead to
lower welfare.
6Although vL is, obviously, below p
∗∗
b , p
∗∗
b and v˜L cannot be ranked based on (A2) and δ ∈ (δ, δ).
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6 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of the Internet on prices charged by conventional retailers
and economic welfare. Two settings were investigated in the context of a circular city model,
the benchmark with brick-and-mortar stores, and the Internet setting with two types of firms,
conventional and electronic.
Under the benchmark, when the individual expected demand is inelastic, brick-and-mortar
firms charge the price accepted by consumers who discover they have high valuations. When
individual expected demand is elastic, the firms charge the price accepted by all consumers.
Under the Internet setting, parameter restrictions were derived that give rise to the fol-
lowing type of market segmentation. Each consumer visits a conventional store and inspects
the product; consumers with high valuations buy the good there, whereas consumers with low
valuations return home and order the product online.
With these parameter restrictions in place, the impact of the Internet on economic welfare
was explored. In the case of inelastic demand, welfare rises when electronic firms enter the
market, because consumers with low valuations order the good on the Internet. In the case
of elastic demand, welfare falls. One source of welfare decline is that consumers with low
valuations switch their purchases from conventional retailers to Internet firms and, therefore,
experience waiting costs. The other source is increase in excessive entry.
The main message of this paper is that goods that are physically identical may often, nev-
ertheless, be differentiated by the modes through which they are marketed and sold. Electronic
retailing, although it reduces consumer search and travelling costs, is not frictionless. Con-
sumers do not always know what they are getting when they purchase a product online and
they often must experience significant delays between the time they order a good and the time
they receive it. Moreover, when these frictions interact with the market imperfections coming
in conventional retailing, the resulting increase in competition need not lead to a superior
social outcome.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Suppose vL ∈ [0, vL). Consider a firm that charges price pb, which is accepted by consumers
with high valuations. Its rivals located at distance 1/n∗b charge price p
∗
b , which is also
accepted only by consumers with high valuations. The firm captures consumers living
within distance x defined by
λ(vH − pb)− tx = λ(vH − p∗b)− t
(
1
n∗b
− x
)
,
or
x(pb, p∗b) =
1
2t
(
t
n∗b
+ λp∗b − λpb
)
.
The firm’s profit function equals
Π(pb, p∗b) = 2λLx(pb, p
∗
b)(pb − c)− φ =
λL
t
(
t
n∗b
+ λp∗b − λpb
)
(pb − c)− φ.
Substituting pb = p∗b into the first-order conditions yields
t
n∗b
− λ(p∗b − c) = 0,
or
p∗b = c+
t
λn∗b
.
The equilibrium number of firms can be found from the zero-profit condition
λL
n∗b
t
λn∗b
= φ,
where the first term on the right is the number of consumers who purchase from each
b-firm in equilibrium, and the second term is the price margin. Hence,
n∗b =
√
tL
φ
.
Substituting n∗b back into the equilibrium price yields
p∗b = c+
1
λ
√
tφ
L
.
Next, suppose the firm deviates from p∗b and sets its price to vL in order to sell the good to
all consumers. In this case the firm captures consumers living within distance xˆ defined
by
λvH + (1− λ)vL − vL − txˆ = λ(vH − p∗b)− t
(
1
n∗b
− xˆ
)
,
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or
xˆ =
1
2t
(
t
n∗b
+ λp∗b − λvL
)
.
The firm’s profit from this deviation is
Πˆ = 2Lxˆ(vL − c)− φ = L
t
(
t
n∗b
+ λp∗b − λvL
)
(vL − c)− φ
=
L
t
(
2
√
tφ
L
− λ(vL − c)
)
(vL − c)− φ.
Straightforward, but tedious algebra shows that Πˆ < 0 if and only if vL < vL.
Finally, consider the consumer located right in the middle between two neighboring firms.
His payoff is positive by (A1),
λ(vH − p∗b)−
t
2n∗b
= λ
(
vH − c− 1
λ
√
tφ
L
)
− 1
2
√
tφ
L
= λ
(
vH − c− 32λ
√
tφ
L
)
> 0.
(ii) Suppose vL ∈ [vL, vL]. Consider a firm that charges price pb, which is accepted by all
consumers. Its rivals located at distance 1/n∗b charge price p
∗
b , which is also accepted by
all consumers. The firm captures consumers living within distance x defined by
λvH + (1− λ)vL − pb − tx = λvH + (1− λ)vL − p∗b − t
(
1
n∗b
− x
)
,
or
x(pb, p∗b) =
1
2t
(
t
n∗b
+ p∗b − pb
)
.
The firm maximizes
Π(pb, p∗b) = 2Lx(pb, p
∗
b)(pb − c)− φ =
L
t
(
t
n∗b
+ p∗b − pb
)
(pb − c)− φ
subject to
pb ≤ vL.
The solution is
pˆb = min
{
vL,
1
2
(
t
n∗b
+ p∗b + c
)}
.
Substituting p∗b = vL and n
∗
b = L(vL − c)/φ yields
pˆb = min
{
vL,
1
2
(
tφ
L(vL − c) + vL + c
)}
= min
{
vL, vL +
1
2(vL − c)
[
tφ
L
− (vL − c)2
]}
.
The term in brackets is non-negative because vL ≤ vL. Hence, pˆb = vL.
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(iii) Suppose vL ∈ (vL, vH ]. Consider a firm that charges price pb, which is accepted by all
consumers. Its rivals located at distance 1/n∗b charge price p
∗
b , which is also accepted by
all consumers. The firm captures consumers living within distance x defined by
λvH + (1− λ)vL − pb − tx = λvH + (1− λ)vL − p∗b − t
(
1
n∗b
− x
)
,
or
x(pb, p∗b) =
1
2t
(
t
n∗b
+ p∗b − pb
)
.
The firm’s profit function equals
Π(pb, p∗b) = 2Lx(pb, p
∗
b)(pb − c)− φ =
L
t
(
t
n∗b
+ p∗b − pb
)
(pb − c)− φ.
Substituting pb = p∗b into the first-order conditions yields
t
n∗b
− (p∗b − c) = 0,
or
p∗b = c+
t
n∗b
.
The equilibrium number of firms can be found from the zero-profit condition
L
n∗b
t
n∗b
= φ,
hence,
n∗b =
√
tL
φ
.
Substituting n∗b back into the equilibrium price yields
p∗b = c+
√
tφ
L
.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, observe that c/δ < v˜L for δ > δ. Facing price p∗∗b charged by b-firms, consumers with
low valuations order the good online if
δvL − c > max{0, vL − p∗∗b } = max
{
0, vL − c− 1
λ
√
tφ
L
}
,
or
c
δ
< vL <
1
(1− δ)λ
√
tφ
L
,
which clearly holds for vL ∈ (c/δ, v˜L). Consumers with high valuations buy the good from
b-firms if
vH − p∗∗b > δvH − c,
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or
δ <
vH − 1λ
√
tφ
L
vH
,
which holds for δ < δ.
Next, suppose a b-firm deviates from p∗∗b and sets its price to c+ (1− δ)vL in order to sell
the good to all consumers. In this case the firm captures consumers living within distance xˆ
defined by
λvH + (1− λ)vL − (c+ (1− δ)vL)− txˆ = λ(vH − p∗∗b ) + (1− λ)(δvL − c)− t
(
1
n∗∗b
− xˆ
)
,
or
xˆ =
1
2t
(
t
n∗∗b
+ λp∗∗b − λ(c+ (1− δ)vL)
)
.
The firm’s profit from this deviation is
Πˆ = 2Lxˆ(1− δ)vL − φ = L
t
(
t
n∗∗b
+ λp∗∗b − λ(c+ (1− δ)vL)
)
(1− δ)vL − φ
=
L
t
(
2
√
tφ
L
− λ(1− δ)vL
)
− φ.
Straightforward, but tedious algebra shows that Πˆ < 0 if and only if vL < v˜L.
Finally, consider the consumer located right in the middle between two neighboring b-firms.
His expected payoff from visiting a b-firm is higher than ordering the good online in the first
place if
λ(vH − p∗∗b ) + (1− λ)(δvL − c)−
t
2n∗∗b
> λ(δvH − c) + (1− λ)(δvL − c),
or
δ <
vH − 32λ
√
tφ
L
vH
= δ.
Proof of Proposition 3
First, consider the Internet setting. By Proposition 2, consumers with high valuations purchase
the product from b-firms, whereas consumers with low valuations order online. The surplus
generated by producing and distributing the good equals
S∗∗ = L(λvH + (1− λ)δvL − c).
Summing up the entry and travelling costs (consumers travel 1/(4n∗∗b ) on average) yields
C∗∗ =
tL
4n∗∗b
+ φn∗∗b =
tL
4
(√
tL
φ
)−1
+ φ
√
tL
φ
=
5L
4
√
tφ
L
.
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Hence, welfare under the Internet setting is given by
W ∗∗ = S∗∗ − C∗∗ = L(λvH + (1− λ)δvL − c)− 5L4
√
tφ
L
.
Next, consider the benchmark.
(i) When vL ∈ [c/δ, vL), only consumers with high valuations purchase the product in equi-
librium. The surplus generated by producing and distributing the good equals
S∗ = Lλ(vH − c).
Summing up entry and travelling costs yields
C∗ =
tL
4n∗b
+ φn∗b =
tL
4
(√
tL
φ
)−1
+ φ
√
tL
φ
=
5L
4
√
tφ
L
.
Hence, welfare under the benchmark is given by
W ∗ = Lλ(vH − c)− 5L4
√
tφ
L
.
The change in welfare is positive:
W ∗∗ −W ∗ = L(1− λ)(δvL − c) > 0.
(iia) Consider vL ∈ [vL,min{v˜L, vL}). In this case,
S∗ = L(λvH + (1− λ)vL − c),
C∗ =
tL
4n∗b
+ φn∗b =
tL
4
(
L
φ
(vL − c)
)−1
+ φ
L
φ
(vL − c) = tφ4(vL − c) + L(vL − c).
Welfare equals
W ∗ = L(λvH + (1− λ)vL − c))−
(
tφ
4(vL − c) + L(vL − c)
)
,
hence,
W ∗∗ −W ∗ = −L(1− λ)(1− δ)vL −
[
tφ
4(vL − c) + L(vL − c)−
5L
4
√
tφ
L
]
.
Straightforward, but tedious algebra shows that the term in brackets is positive. Hence,
W ∗∗ −W ∗ < 0.
(iib) If vL < v˜L, consider vL ∈ [vL, v˜L). In this case,
S∗ = L(λvH + (1− λ)vL − c),
C∗ =
tL
4n∗b
+ φn∗b =
tL
4
(√
tL
φ
)−1
+ φ
√
tL
φ
=
5L
4
√
tφ
L
.
Welfare equals
W ∗ = L(λvH + (1− λ)vL − c))− 5L4
√
tφ
L
,
hence,
W ∗∗ −W ∗ == −L(1− λ)(1− δ)vL < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Consider vL ∈ (c/δ,min{v˜L, p∗∗b }). When there are n∗∗b b-firms on the circle and they charge
price p∗∗b , each oﬄine consumer visits the closest b-firm and purchases the product there
if his valuation is high. Indeed,
λ(vH − p∗∗b )−
t
2n∗∗b
> 0
holds because
λ(vH − p∗∗b ) + (1− λ)(δvL − c)−
t
2n∗∗b
> λ(δvH − c) + (1− λ)(δvL − c)
holds for δ < δ (see proof of Proposition 2). Hence, p∗∗b () = p
∗∗
b and n
∗∗
b () = n
∗∗
b for
small values of , such that the deviation to vL is unprofitable.
(ii) If p∗∗b < v˜L, consider vL ∈ [p∗∗b , v˜L). Consider a b-firm that charges price pb, which
is accepted by all oﬄine consumers and original consumers with high valuations. Its
rivals located at distance 1/n∗∗b () charge price p
∗∗
b (), which is also accepted by all
oﬄine consumers and original consumers with high valuations. The firm captures original
consumers within distance x defined by
λ(vH − pb) + (1− λ)(δvL − c)− tx
= λ(vH − p∗∗b ()) + (1− λ)(δvL − c)− t
(
1
n∗∗b ()
− x
)
and oﬄine consumers located within distance x′ defined by
λvH + (1− λ)vL − pb − tx′ = λvH + (1− λ)vL − p∗∗b ()− t
(
1
n∗∗b ()
− x′
)
.
Hence,
x =
1
2t
(
t
n∗∗b ()
+ λp∗∗b ()− λpb
)
and
x′ =
1
2t
(
t
n∗∗b ()
+ p∗∗b ()− pb
)
.
The firm’s profit function equals
Π(pb, p∗∗b ()) = 2L(λ(1− )x+ x′)(pb − c)− φ
=
L
t
(
(λ(1− ) + ) t
n∗∗b ()
+ (λ2(1− ) + )(p∗∗b ()− pb)
)
(pb − c)− φ.
Substituting pb = p∗∗b () into the first-order conditions yields
(λ(1− ) + ) t
n∗∗b ()
− (λ2(1− ) + )(p∗∗b ()− c) = 0,
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or
p∗∗b () = c+
(λ(1− ) + )t
(λ2(1− ) + )n∗∗b ()
.
The equilibrium number of b-firms can be found from the zero-profit condition
(λ(1− ) + )L
n∗∗b ()
(λ(1− ) + )t
(λ2(1− ) + )n∗∗b ()
= φ,
hence,
n∗∗b () =
λ(1− ) + √
λ2(1− ) + 
√
tL
φ
.
Substituting n∗∗b () back into the equilibrium price yields
p∗∗b () = c+
1√
λ2(1− ) + 
√
tφ
L
.
Proof: Original consumers fare better in the presence of oﬄine consumers
Straightforward, but tedious algebra that follows below reveals
λ(p∗∗b − p∗∗b ()) >
t
4n∗∗b ()
− t
4n∗∗b
.
That is,
λ
(
1
λ
− 1√
λ2(1− ) + 
)
>
1
4
(√
λ2(1− ) + 
λ(1− ) +  − 1
)
.
Expanding
√
λ2(1− ) +  around  = 0 yields
√
λ2(1− ) +  ≈ λ+ 1− λ
2
2λ
.
The inequality becomes
1− λ
λ+ 1−λ22λ 
>
1
4
(
λ+ 1−λ
2
2λ 
λ(1− ) +  − 1
)
,
or
(1− λ2)
2λ2 + (1− λ2) >
(1− λ)2
4 (2λ2 + 2λ(1− λ)) .
Dividing both sides by (1− λ) yields
1 + λ
2λ2 + (1− λ2) >
1− λ
4 (2λ2 + 2λ(1− λ)) .
Because the above inequality holds strictly when  = 0, it will also hold for sufficiently small
values of .
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Proof of Proposition 5
Because vL > c, patient consumers order the product online from the outset. Consider a b-firm
that charges price pb, which is accepted by original consumers with high valuations. Its rivals
located at distance 1/n∗∗b (ξ) charge price p
∗∗
b (ξ), which is also accepted by original consumers
with high valuations. The firm captures original consumers within distance x defined by
λ(vH − pb) + (1− λ)(δvL − c)− tx
= λ(vH − p∗∗b (ξ)) + (1− λ)(δvL − c)− t
(
1
n∗∗b (ξ)
− x
)
,
or
x =
1
2t
(
t
n∗∗b (ξ)
+ λp∗∗b (ξ)− λpb
)
.
The firm’s profit function equals
Π(pb, p∗∗b (ξ)) = 2Lλ(1− ξ)x(pb − c)− φ =
λ(1− ξ)L
t
(
t
n∗∗b (ξ)
+ λp∗∗b (ξ)− λpb
)
(pb − c)− φ.
Substituting pb = p∗∗b (ξ) into the first-order conditions yields
t
n∗∗b (ξ)
− λ(p∗∗b (ξ)− c) = 0,
or
p∗∗b (ξ) = c+
t
λn∗∗b (ξ)
.
The equilibrium number of firms can be found from the zero-profit condition
λ(1− ξ)L
n∗∗b (ξ)
t
λn∗∗b (ξ)
= φ,
hence,
n∗∗b (ξ) =
√
1− ξ
√
tL
φ
.
Substituting n∗∗b (ξ) back into the equilibrium price yields
p∗∗b (ξ) = c+
1
λ
√
1− ξ
√
tφ
L
.
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Appendix B
Proposition 6 specifies the parameter conditions under which each of three possible monopoly
equilibrium configurations obtains. The proof is straightforward, but rather tedious, and will
be provided upon request.
Proposition 6 (Monopoly Equilibrium Configurations under the Benchmark).
Assume vH > c.
(i) If {
c < λvH ,
0 ≤ vL < 12
(
vH + c−
√
(vH − c)2 − (λvH − c)2
)
,
and
φ =
λL
2t
(λvH − c)2,
then each firm acts as a local monopolist and charges price
p∗b =
λvH + c
2
that attracts consumers located within distance (λvH − c)/t. Of all consumers who travel
to a firm only those with high valuations purchase the product.
(ii) If either {
c < λvH ,
1
2
(
vH + c−
√
(vH − c)2 − (λvH − c)2
)
≤ vL ≤ 11+λ(λvH + c),
or {
λvH ≤ c,
c < vL ≤ 11+λ(λvH + c),
and
φ =
2L
t
λ(vH − vL)(vL − c),
then each firm acts as a local monopolist and charges price p∗b = vL that attracts con-
sumers located within distance λ(vH−vL)/t. All consumers who travel to a firm purchase
the product.
(iii) If
1
1 + λ
(λvH + c) < vL ≤ vH
and
φ =
L
2t
(λvH + (1− λvL)− c)2,
then each firm acts as a local monopolist and charges price
p∗b =
λvH + (1− λ)vL + c
2
that attracts consumers located within distance (λvH + (1 − λ)vL − c)/t. All consumers
who travel to a firm purchase the product.
23
It is straightforward to verify that c < (λvH + c)/(1 + λ). Also, the following comparison
holds for c < λvH :
c <
1
2
(
vH + c−
√
(vH − c)2 − (λvH − c)2
)
<
1
1 + λ
(λvH + c).
Corollary 1. There will be no firms operating in the market in either of the following five
parameter regions: 
c < λvH ,
0 ≤ vL < 12
(
vH + c−
√
(vH − c)2 − (λvH − c)2
)
,
φ > λL2t (λvH − c)2.
(1)

c < λvH ,
1
2
(
vH + c−
√
(vH − c)2 − (λvH − c)2
)
≤ vL ≤ 11+λ(λvH + c),
φ > 2Lt λ(vH − vL)(vL − c).
(2)
{
λvH ≤ c,
vL ≤ c.
(3)
λvH ≤ c,
c < vL ≤ 11+λ(λvH + c),
φ > 2Lt λ(vH − vL)(vL − c).
(4)
{
1
1+λ(λvH + c) < vL ≤ vH ,
φ > L2t(λvH + (1− λvL)− c)2.
(5)
When entry cost φ is not as low as in (A1), and not as high as in Corollary 1, one of three
possible kinked equilibrium configurations obtains (the equilibrium price might be below, equal,
or above vL). The markets of any two neighboring firms just touch (i.e., the consumer located
in the middle receives zero payoff from visiting either of the two firms). This, however, does
not mean that the firms act as local monopolists. The firms do compete with each other, but
less vigorous than in Proposition 1. (In Proposition 1 the firms steal customers from each
other, and the consumers in the middle receive strictly positive payoffs.)
Derivation of the exact conditions under which each of three kinked equilibrium config-
urations obtains is algebraically much more intense than the proofs of Proposition 1 and
Proposition 6.
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